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Abstract 
Paths to adulthood have changed greatly in the last decades: entries into the labour market as well as into 
partnership or parenthood have been postponed, with also new sequences and interconnections. In this piece of 
work we observe life-courses from the ages of 14 to 35 of men and women born in four successive cohorts. We 
distinguish them by level of education, and we analyse the timing and frequencies of their first job, the first job 
as an insider (as an employee with a permanent contract or as a typical self-employed worker), episodes of 
atypical work or unemployment between first job and age 35, couple formation, and childbirth.  Our analyses 
confirm that today’s young Italians form a ‘postponement generation’, which achieves later, if at all, what 
previous generations had already achieved in their twenties. For men, until the cohort born in the 1960s, the 
norm for both high- and low-educated men was to be insiders at age 35, and to achieve that status rapidly. What 
has changed is that now men become labour-market insiders later, and the route is more tortuous, with long and 
repeated spells of unemployment or atypical work. For women – for whom being in employment, and working 
as insiders, has never been the norm – the change has been their greater involvement in the labour market, but 
with the greater risk, compared with men, of job insecurity, especially if their education level is low. In the later 
cohorts, the ages at first marriage or cohabitation and first childbirth have also changed, especially for highly-
educated men. This is strongly connected with changes in labour market paths, but with gender differences. Not 
holding an insider position inhibits the assumption of family responsibilities for men. For women economic and 
job insecurity seem to have less influence on childbirth.  
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1. Introduction  
 
If we compare the lives of young people today with those of their parents or grandparents, it is 
clear that the modes, timing and outcomes of becoming an adult have changed profoundly in 
all European countries. The timeframes of the various phases – completing full-time 
education, entering the labour market (with a ‘good’ job), the creation of a stable relationship, 
and the birth of a child – have extended:. The sequences and synchronizations have also 
varied: it is increasingly unusual to find work soon after the completion of full-time 
education; young people leave the parental home soon after starting a career or only to get 
married, or they have children only after marriage. There has also been a transformation in the 
stages attained: increasingly more women are in higher education, and then enter the labour 
force and remain in it even after marriage or maternity, and increasingly more men and 
women do not marry, or do not have children [Cavalli and Galland 1996; Corijn and Klijzing 
2001; Shanahan 2000].  
However, the forms and speed of these changes are not identical everywhere. In Italy, 
as in the other Southern European countries, the ‘delay syndrome’ is much more apparent, 
especially with regard to entry into the labour market, leaving the parental home, and the 
transition to the first child [Schizzerotto and Lucchini 2004; Ambrosi and Rosina 2009]. 
Moreover, once the labour market has been entered, particularly in Italy, there is a high risk of 
becoming trapped in insecure careers for several years [Barbieri 2009]. This also has 
significant repercussions for family trajectories  [Blossfeld et al. 2005; Bozzon 2009; 
Mazzuco et al. 2006 and 2007]. Another cause of delays in family transitions  is the lack of 
policies which support the costs of children, both economic and in terms of opportunity, and 
the persisting presence of marked gender asymmetries. Although there have been important 
changes, female employment rates in Italy are still relatively low; the gap between male and 
female unemployment rates is still relatively wide, and the extent to which men share family 
obligations and responsibilities is among the lowest in Europe [Reyneri 2009; Naldini and 
Saraceno 2011]. Finally, whilst young people in other countries are experimenting with 
different forms of economic or housing independence (living alone, sharing with other young 
people, or cohabiting as a couple) and non-linear paths (for example, having a child while still 
students), in Italy the prolongation of the transition to adulthood has taken place within 
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traditional models of family formation, and the incidence of cohabitation and childbirth 
outside marriage is relatively small, tough increasing quickly in the last few years [Naldini 
and Jurado 2010].  
This study is prompted by previous research and the debate which it engendered. It 
concentrates on Italy, and explores the modes and timings of the transition to adulthood, using 
data from the Italian longitudinal household survey (ILFI 2005). We analyse life-courses from 
the ages of 14 (or the first job) to 35 of men and women born in four successive cohorts 
(1930-39, 1940-49, 1950-59 e 1960-691). We consider the first job, the first job as an insider 
(as an employee with a permanent contract or as a typical self-employed worker), episodes of 
atypical work or unemployment between the date of the first job and the age of 35, couple 
formation (by marriage or cohabitation), and childbirth. 
To take account of the flexibilization of the labour market, dimensions which refer to 
the labour-market situation have been defined not only at the time of the first job, as is the 
usual practice in studies on the transition to adulthood, but also by considering the type of 
contract and the continuity of employment in the early part of a career. This is crucial for 
grasping the level of autonomy and security enjoyed by young adults. Economic and work-
related flexibility and uncertainty are then studied in connection with family careers, given 
that while the dimensions of autonomy and security may have value per se, they are also, as 
evidenced by many studies, instrumental to the attainment of other adult goals, such as family 
formation [Gallino 2001; Blossfeld et al. 2005; Micheli 2006]. More specifically, we shall 
focus on what, and how many, young people have already formed a couple by the age of 35 
(whether they are married or cohabiting) and have had at least one child; on what, and how 
many, young people are unemployed or inactive; if they are in employment, on whether they 
have, or do not have, open-ended employment contracts; and on how, and to what extent, the 
age at which these events occur, as well as the time elapsing between them, have changed. 
Our analysis of the labour-market situation will identify when these stages are reached and 
also the paths that have been followed. These may include periods of unemployment, work on 
atypical contracts, or inactivity. In the final section, we examine the connection between 
                                                          
1
 Because the most recent wave of the ILFI dates back to 2005, we have excluded subjects born after 1960, because we are 
unable to observe them until the age of 35. 
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work- and family-related trajectories, and we look at the impact of education and labour 
market position on the birth of the first child. 
Entry into the labour market, spells of atypical work or periods of inactivity, and their 
duration, the moment of forming a couple or becoming a parent, but also the influence of 
economic independence and a career on determining the pace of the family career, differ 
between men and women. They also differ according to the investment in education. 
Education is a crucial vehicle of present and future resources, whether instrumental, cognitive 
or identitarian. The level of education on entry into the labour market, union and parenthood 
is therefore important for identifying timings, modes, and outcomes. In this study, therefore, 
unlike many Italian studies on the transition to adulthood which focus on differences by social 
class of origin [Schizzerotto 2002; Barbagli et al. 2003; Negri and Filandri 2010], we shall 
examine variations by level of education2 and gender. Our purpose is to analyse for whom the 
path to adulthood has changed the most (men or women, or lower- or more highly-educated 
individuals), in what dimensions the change has been greatest (in the labour market or in 
family formation) and to what extent, and in what way education polarized patterns of entry 
into adulthood in the past compared with today. 
 
 
2.   The Italian model: changes since the second post-war period 
 
Individual life-courses are deeply embedded in historical time. They are structured by the 
cultural, economic and institutional configurations of the context in which they unfold 
[Brückner and Mayer 2005; Kohli 2001]. The destandardization and extension of adult life-
courses that we see today stem from the macro transformations which occurred from the mid-
1970s onwards. As advocates of the second demographic transition have demonstrated, the 
change concerned those values which placed increasing emphasis on personal autonomy, self-
fulfilment, consumption, the reversibility of choices, and freedom from familial and social 
constraints [Lestaeghe 1995; Liefbroer and Fokkema 2008; Van de Kaa 1994; Sobotka 2008]. 
As many institutional scholars have shown, also to change were the labour market, welfare 
                                                          
2
 Our analyses will be divided according to a higher or lower level of education. By ‘higher’, we mean possession of an 
upper-secondary diploma or a degree; by ‘lower’, we mean possession of an elementary or lower-secondary certificate. 
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system, and family structures amid which individuals build their lives [Esping-Andersen 
1999; Mayer 1994; Livi Bacci 2009]. In many European countries, the second post-war 
period was a time of economic and social expansion, and of evolution of the welfare state, 
dependent employment, and protections designed to cover periods of unemployment and old 
age, and to support the maintenance and progression of wage levels. However, this growth 
took place within clear gender and family models: the first individual to enjoy protection was 
the so-called ‘Fordist male breadwinner’, on the assumptions of full employment, relative 
stability and homogeneity of the labour market, stable marriages, and the widespread 
domestic and care work undertaken by women who for the most part were not active in the 
labour market. The scenario changed after the mid-1970s: there was increased uncertainty in 
the labour market, in protection against new social risks, in the duration and frequency of 
marriages, and in the availability of female domestic labour [Blossfeld et al. 2005; Del Boca 
and Rosina 2009]. There were changes in life-courses, their patterns, and the 
interdependencies between work and family, and between men and women. During the 
‘Fordist’ era, a typical male life-course was marked by a orderly, rapid, and complete 
sequence: school – work (immediately stable) – leaving home – marriage – children. In 
female life-courses, on the other hand, especially those of middle- to upper-class women, paid 
work was optional, or else limited to phases during which there were no family 
responsibilities to assume. The transition of women to adulthood again typically followed a 
orderly and rapid sequence, but it was less articulated, and consisted of school – (work) – 
leaving home – marriage – children. In the ‘post-Fordist’ era, however, the life-courses of 
young men and women have become more similar in certain respects. Education and work are 
everywhere increasingly characteristic of the female experience. Work has become 
increasingly uncertain for men and women alike, with regard to duration, income, and future 
prospects. Another effect of this growing uncertainty is that both men and women tend to put 
off leaving home and having a family [Blossfeld et al. 2005; Schizzerotto and Lucchini 2002]. 
Nonetheless, in all European countries it is still women (and above all those with lower 
education levels) who are trapped in unstable, ‘bad’ jobs, and who reduce their workload or 
quit work when they have children. 
Although these transitions have affected all countries alike, and assumed the aspects 
described, a good deal of research has provided a more diversified picture. Significant 
 6 
variations in the process and configuration of life-courses exist in the past as they do today 
according to country, gender, social class or education, and for different areas within single 
countries. Even in the golden age of the 1950s and 1960s, not everyone experienced a ‘good’ 
‘Fordist’ life-course, and not everyone enjoyed rapid and stable entry into adulthood. In the 
1980s and 1990s, uncertainty increased, but not for everyone, nor in the same way, nor for the 
same amount of time, and not with the same outcomes in terms of poverty, opportunities, and 
choices such as starting a family. 
Firstly, not all countries experienced the so-called ‘golden age’ to the same extent or in 
the same manner. In Italy, in particular, both industrialization and tertiarization were belated, 
and then only partial, and there were marked differences between the north and south of the 
country, between formal and informal, between small and large enterprises, and between the 
public and private sectors. The result was that the protections which had developed around the 
figure of the employed male head of family in the 1970s left large portions of the population 
exposed: men and women in non-primary labour markets, and non-working women, who 
gained access to the ‘golden’ protection offered by the labour market and welfare by 
secondary routes insofar as they were the wives of protected workers. 
Secondly, not all countries responded in the same way to the ‘post-Fordist’ changes under 
way: on the one hand, the growing entry and permanence of women in the labour market and 
increasingly unstable marriages, which made it ever more desirable and necessary to reconcile 
family duties and paid employment; and, on the other, the growing flexibilization of the 
labour market which required new forms of protection unconnected with the type of contract, 
employer, status, and occupational history. In Italy, both ‘protected flexibility’ policies and 
those supporting family-work reconciliation are still weak. The model of industrial, 
corporative and familistic citizenship resists change [Solera and Negri 2007].   
Even within the same context, uncertainty neither affects everyone nor does it consistently 
produce an ‘inevitable’ or ‘negative’ delay. In Italy, unlike in the past, it is now individuals 
from the higher social classes who begin work, leave home, and start families later. It is these 
same individuals who exhibit a closer match between first job and qualifications, and who, 
although they suffer periods of uncertainty with atypical contracts and low incomes, later set 
off along prestigious career paths. By contrast, individuals with low education levels or from 
a low social class, who accept a first job of any kind which does match their qualifications, or 
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is atypical, and above all who do not leave it quickly, are more likely to be trapped in 
precarious employment [Barbieri and Scherer 2005; Negri and Filandri 2010]. This change of 
sign in the effects of the social class of origin in Italy indicates that the delay which has 
undoubtedly characterized the life-courses of young people over the past decades – and 
especially those of young Italians – has not only been ‘undergone’ but also ‘acted upon’ and 
‘chosen’. It may be a strategy of investment in education characterised by a wait before 
securing a ‘positive’ transition to adulthood, so to embarking on a worthy career, and 
obtaining a job consistent with the lifestyle and expectations with which the person has grown 
up (or at least not inferior to those of the parents).  
This change of sign also shows that in a context like Italy, the family of origin and 
personal resources are still decisive. If it is true that social class and education structure life-
courses everywhere, this is all the more so in familistic welfare regimes. Here, education 
levels have not only accompanied changes in behaviour and attitudes, but still strongly 
differentiate them – especially in the case of women. Education furnishes not only various 
modes of access to the labour market, but also different models of gender identity. It also 
transmits different types of economic, cultural and social capital, and various strategies to 
cope with the growing flexibilization of the labour market. In a context like Italy, where there 
is weak welfare and a strong family, the social class (of origin of the individual and his or her 
partner) still counts for a great deal; it cushions against increased uncertainty in the labour 
market, and gives support in meeting the direct costs and reconciliation costs of starting a 
family [Bertolini and Rizza 2005; Mencarini 2009, Mencarini and Tanturri 2006, Sabbadini 
2002; Saraceno 2008].  
 
 
3.  Working and starting a family: the situation at age 35  
 
From the mid-1960s onwards, the female labour supply changed markedly in all advanced 
capitalist countries. Women began to make a massive investment in education and the labour 
market. They both entered it with greater frequency and remained in it longer, reducing the 
number of interruptions around marriage or childbirth, or reducing the duration of those 
interruptions [Solera 2009a e 2009b]. This is evident in Figure 1, which shows that the share of 
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low-educated women without a spell of paid employment by the time they reached 35 halved 
between the first and second cohort (that is, for those who reached age 20 during the 1970s). 
On the other hand, both in the past and today, it is rare to find highly-educated women who 
have never worked. Their weight has shifted: in the older cohorts, only 13% of women had 
upper-secondary diplomas or degrees, whereas these represent 58% of the latest cohort (Table 
13). Their combination of work and family also changed; ceteris paribus, more highly-
educated women less frequently leave the labour market to devote themselves full-time to 
family work, and they more frequently re-enter it if they have left [Solera 2009a].   
The growth of the female labour supply has been driven not only by changes in the 
desires, identity, and practices of women, and in their political visibility, but also in the 
demand for labour, with the growth of ‘women-friendly’ areas, notably in services, and 
especially in the public sector, albeit in a more limited – and territorially more heterogeneous 
– manner than in other European countries. There has also been a change in regulation of the 
labour market since the 1980s. As Anastasia et al. (2011) describe, the 1960s and 1970s were 
years of public regulation intended to ensure employment stability, and thereafter, in response 
to growing youth unemployment, to favour the labour-market entry of young people. On the 
other hand, in the mid-1980s, and above all at the end of the 1990s, there began a phase of 
labour-market deregulation. The Treu Law of 1997 introduced a series of new types of fixed-
term employment contract, which were further liberalized and extended by legislation in the 
following years. The outcome was a growth of temporary work, but with two peculiarities. 
First, it did not ‘revolutionize’ the structure of the Italian labour market. Although the growth 
rate was among the highest in the previous fifteen years compared with the other European 
countries, especially those of Continental and Northern Europe, the share of temporary work 
in Italy as a percentage of total paid work remained low. Second, compared with Europe as a 
whole, temporary work in Italy is extremely segmented by gender (more women are affected) 
and cohort (more younger workers are affected; Dell’Aringa, 2009). This segmentation is 
connected with what many authors term ‘partial and selective deregulation’, which has almost 
exclusively concerned new forms of access to the labour market consisting of not only fixed-
term jobs but also ones with low wages and limited protection, and which has instead left 
                                                          
3
 In order to avoid too small numbers, especially in the older age cohorts, and to simplify comparison, university degrees and 
upper-secondary diplomas are treated jointly in the analyses which follow.  
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intact the levels of legislative and welfare protection afforded to open-ended employment 
relationships – and without universalistic, general reform of the social shock absorbers 
(unemployment benefits, guaranteed minimum wage schemes, and maternity and parental 
allowances and leave). This has reinforced the insider/outsider structure of the Italian labour 
market by introducing new cleavages. As early as the 1970s and 1980s, in a period when the 
Italian labour market was described as rigid, highly-regulated and protected, this, as said, in 
fact applied only to dependent employment, above all in the public sector and in large firms. 
Alongside these ‘Fordist’ workers – men for the most part –there was a significant minority of 
men and women precariously employed in agriculture, the services sector, and small firms, 
many of which were family-run and with frequent ‘births’ and ‘deaths’ [Contini and 
Trivellato 2005]. Self-employment and irregular work were rife, and many authors have 
interpreted their growth as a de facto response to the need for flexibility, lower labour costs, 
and the dismissal of workers not possible by legal means. The reregulation process of the past 
twenty years has meant that new forms of segmentation between typical and atypical labour, 
and between new and old entries into the labour market, have been added to the already-
existing ones between formal and informal work, the public and private sectors, small and 
large firms, and employment and self-employment. The result of this flexibilization at the 
margins, therefore, has been that those most affected were the outsiders: young people, 
women (including those returning from maternity leave), and immigrants [Esping-Andersen 
and Regini 2000; Barbieri and Scherer 2005; Anastasia et al. 2011].   
We shall not discuss here whether deregulation of the labour market was beneficial in 
terms of micro and macro equilibrium and outcomes. Figure 1 shows how many people were 
insiders at age 35 in the various cohorts. We follow Barbieri and Scherer [2005] by defining 
as insiders those who are ‘typical’, that is, who are in open-ended employment or are the 
‘classic’ self-employed (craftsmen, traders, professionals, and not ‘quasi-subordinates’ such 
as employer-coordinated freelances or casual workers). The insider/outsider definition is 
based on the type of contract and the type of social protection given to that contract or job. It 
is therefore part of the debate on welfare models, these being models for regulation of the 
economy and everyday life. Having a fixed-term contract does not necessarily mean greater 
job insecurity: many workers on fixed-term contracts have them renewed more than once, 
while many workers on open-ended employment contracts are made redundant. There is, 
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however, an imbalance in the levels of social protection and insecurity, both actual and 
perceived; uncertainties over the continuity and level of income, and over job stability. All 
these factors have a significant effect not only on the stages and features of the career, but 
also on the other areas of life, especially the family.  
As said at the end of the first section, we distinguish all analyses not only by cohort and 
gender, but also by education level. This enables us to gainsay images of homogeneity and to 
show how the life-courses of men and women with higher and lower education levels differed 
between the past and today. This also permits, as we compare the situation at age 35 among 
the various cohorts, to control for seniority in the labour market; that is, the effect of the 
increased schooling and older age on first employment of today’s young people compared 
with their grandparents or fathers and mothers because they are more educated. 
Figure 1 shows that the share of insiders at age 35 is more or less constant in the first three 
cohorts, and then falls noticeably in the last one, made up of individuals born in the 1960s 
who entered the labour market at the end of the 1980s, and who turned 30 as the deregulation 
of the labour market was beginning, and after the economic crisis of 1992-3. The most stable 
cohorts, for both men and women, seem to be the second and third, those born in the 1940s 
and 1950s, the so-called ‘Fordist’ cohorts of the ‘golden age’. What also emerges from Figure 
1, however, is a clear gender structure assumed and promoted by the ‘Fordist’ model of 
economic regulation and of daily life, and which was only partially modified thereafter. For 
women, being an insider at age 35 has never been the rule, especially for those with lower 
education levels, either because they have never entered the labour market or because they 
entered it and then exited when they became wives or mothers, or because they were more 
involved with the fixed-term or irregular labour markets: one women in two is an insider at 
age 35 if the level of education is high, and one in three if it is low. For men, on the other 
hand, being a worker and an insider was, and continues to be, the prevalent situation: in the 
first three cohorts, the rate is around 90% for the more highly-educated, and around 80% for 
the less highly-educated; in the last cohort, the rate is around 75% for both categories, so there 
is a slightly larger drop in the percentage of men with upper-secondary diplomas or degrees. 
If we exclude the first cohort, which is atypical, especially for women (40% had never had a 
job, and among those working, a significant share were farm helpers) the polarization of the 
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chances of being an insider at age 35 measured by education level has not significantly altered 
for either men or women.  
It is not only the position in the labour market which has changed with respect to the past. 
The times of marriage and childbirth and the places they occupy in a life-course have also 
changed greatly. For those born in the 1950s, being married and having had children by the 
age of 35 was the norm. For the later cohorts, reaching the age of 35 brought different 
situations and experiences: not only were members of these cohorts less likely to have a stable 
position in the labour market, but they were also less likely to have lived in a couple or 
become parents (see Figure 2). The fall is apparent in all areas, but, as we have noted above, it 
was more prevalent in the transition to parenthood. It also affected all categories, but 
especially highly-educated men and women. This may be interpreted as due to a combination 
of choice and constraint. The higher level of investment in education, together with more 
protracted studies and the desire not to waste them by accepting work of any kind, or, for 
women, taking on family responsibilities which might compromise their placement in the 
labour market, has encouraged a delay in the transition to first childbirth. In a country where 
the flexibility of the labour market has increased, but the level of welfare protection in regard 
to this flexibility and the direct and indirect costs of children has remained low, the delays 
have been longer. As various studies have shown, one result of the deregulation discussed 
earlier and of the changes in the labour demand caused by informatization and the growth of 
the services sector has been an increase in job opportunities in recent decades. But wages 
have also fallen, both at the time of entry and thereafter, and the amount of time elapsing 
before achieving a certain level of job stability has increased. As a result, the amount of time 
necessary to reach complete economic independence has lengthened, so that young people are 
more dependent on their families, and the moment of leaving home, and work and life 
aspirations and projects are all delayed [Anastasia et al. 2011; Giorgi et al. 2011]. In a 
situation where gender models, despite significant transformations, still define work in the 
home as an ‘essentially’ female responsibility, and work done by women as ‘subordinate’ to 
that of men [Bimbi 1992; Saraceno 1992; Treas and Widmer 2000], achieving this income or 
career stability has a different significance and weight for men and women. As some 
empirical studies have shown, having a job, and the type of job, count more in the decision to 
start a family for men, who continue to bear responsibility for the direct cost of having 
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children, than it does for women [Bernardi and Nazio 2005; Schizzerotto and Lucchini 2002]. 
It is mostly highly-educated men who have not yet had a child at 35, partly due to increased 
difficulties with becoming settled in the labour market, and partly because the rule that in a 
couple the man should be older than the woman still holds true. For women, on the other 
hand, who might be considered to bear the indirect costs of children – work in the home – the 
kind of job counts for little. What does count a great deal is the level of education, which, if it 
is high, implies a different place for motherhood in the life course; motherhood is increasingly 
carefully considered and interwoven with other types of experience and resources, material 
and symbolic, which women are loath to forgo.  
 The existence of different career paths by gender also emerges from a comparison of 
the timing of the various events which mark the passage to adulthood (see Figure 3). The 
various stages have been pushed forward for men and women alike. For men, regardless of 
the level of education, phases in the labour market always seem to precede those of starting a 
family. Both, however, take place earlier for men with lower education levels, especially with 
regard to the first job. In all cohorts, however, the timing of marriage or cohabitation varies 
little according to education level, whereas the timing of the birth of a child starts to 
differentiate in the last cohort (when the average age for the birth of the first child is 32 for 
low-educated men and over 35 for more highly-educated ones). The age when the first stable 
job is secured is also pushed forward in the last cohort, but the formation of couples takes 
place more rapidly thereafter, and the standard ‘first job – first job as insider – marriage – 
children’ sequence still holds true for both better- and lower-educated men. This suggests that 
there is a strong connection between the man’s work career and long-term projects as a 
couple. As shown elsewhere [Carbone 2010], it also suggests that the delays in parenthood 
experienced especially by highly-educated men are mostly caused by belated ‘good’ entry 
into the labour market. Once job positions have been obtained which are perceived to be 
consistent with class- or human capital-based aspirations, the transition to adulthood is 
accomplished rapidly, cohabitation is commenced as a married or unmarried couple, and a 
family is started, all within a short time. 
This connection is less clear in the case of women, who more often start a family without 
having a job, especially a stable one. In the case of better-educated women, job arrives at the 
same time in the first three cohorts, and later in the last; in the case of lower-educated women, 
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working, and especially working on permanent contracts, has never been a normal situation, 
and this stage is reached rather late, if at all. In addition, compared with men, women 
experience all their life events within a shorter timeframe: in other words, as other studies 
[Zanetti 2010] have found, for women, the ‘work - couple - children’ phases are completed 
within a few years. Once again, it is with the last cohort that the pace changes: the transition 
starts later, but there is also a drop in the share of more-educated women who have completed 
all these stages by the time they reach 35.  
In general, both for men and women, the delay starts with the last cohort considered, those 
born in the 1960s, except for the chances of becoming an insider, where changes started with 
those born in the 1950s. Moreover, for men and women alike, polarization based on education 
levels seems to have increased with time. In the 1950s and 1960s, the tempo and sequences of 
life courses of lower- and better-educated men were quite similar as regards both entry into 
the labour market and settlement within it, forming couples, and having children. In the 
younger cohorts, the timeframes diverge, and, as we have seen, a much smaller share of 
educated men had married and had children by the time they reached 35. For women, 
education has always marked a line, above all as regards labour-market participation, but in 
the case of the younger cohorts it also polarizes maternity times. 
 
 
 
Table 1.  Men and women by educational level and cohort 
 
 Men   (N= 3417) Women  (N=3598) 
 1930-39 1940-49 1950-59 1960-69 1930-39 1940-49 1950-59 1960-69 
Primary school 77.6 63.5 50.8 45.1 87.5 70.6 53.1 41.6 
Secondary school 16.5 26.8 36.6 40.2 9.5 21.6 34.7 42.3 
Degree 5.9 9.7 12.7 14.8 3.1 7.8 12.2 16.1 
 
N  
 
661 
 
827 
 
908 
 
1021 
 
709 
 
908 
 
934 
 
1047 
Source:   our elaboration on ILFI data (2005). 
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% of those having never worked by age 35 
5.6
3.8
16.3
40.0
6.1 5.3
16.5
26.9
1.8
4.5
11.2
23.7
5.6
4.5
13.1
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Notes:    low education=up to lower secondary education;  high education = upper secondary or tertiary education 
Source:   our elaboration on ILFI data(2005). 
 
Figure 1: Labour market status at age 35 by sex, education and cohorts 
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Notes:    low education=up to lower secondary education;  high education = upper secondary or tertiary education 
Source:   our elaboration on ILFI data(2005). 
 
Figure 2: Family status at  age 35 by sex, education  and cohorts 
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Notes:    low education = up to lower secondary education;  high education = upper secondary or tertiary education 
Source:   our elaboration on ILFI data(2005). 
 
Figure. 3. Median age at different events of the  transition to adulthood  between 14 and 35 years old, 
by sex, education and cohort (Kaplan-Meier estimates). 
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The expansion and prolongation of the period of education, and the consequent delay in 
entry into the labour market, have certainly contributed to postponing the various events 
which punctuate the passage to adulthood. Late entry does not, however, appear to cause 
delays in starting a family. Educational level remaining the same, the age at which the first 
job is entered does not vary to any great extent. What changes most is the age at which the 
first typical job is started, and, as we shall see in the next section, the frequency of episodes of 
unemployment or atypical work in the period between the first job and reaching 35 years of 
age. This is also clear from figure 5.4, which shows the average intervals between first job 
and first union, first job and first child, and first union and first child. For the last cohort the 
distance between the timing of first job and of family formation becomes maximum, both for 
men and women, especially those highly-educated.  
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Source:   our elaboration on ILFI data(2005). 
 
Figure. 4. Mean interval between different events of the transition to adulthood between 14 and 35 
years old, by sex, education and cohort (Kaplan-Meier estimates). 
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4.  Life courses and ‘life packages’ between the first job and the age of 35   
 
As we have seen, achieving stability at age 35 was, and still is, the predominant condition for 
men, although its significance started to decrease with the cohort born in the 1960s. For 
women, stable employment has never been the norm (albeit with an inverted U-shaped 
pattern, that is, growth from the first to the third cohort, and a fall in the fourth). What have 
changed most significantly, both for women and men, are working life-courses, which have 
become less linear, more delayed, and beset by uncertainties relative to contracts or income. 
Figure 4 shows the average number of episodes of unemployment or non-insider work (fixed-
term contract or irregular employment) which men and women experience between their first 
job and their thirty-fifth birthday in the various cohorts. 
If we do not distinguish between gender and education levels, life-courses seem to have 
become more difficult: compared with their parents’ or grandparents’ life histories, young 
people today often reach their thirty-fifth birthdays after having undergone spells of being 
unemployed, or working with fixed-term contracts or in the irregular labour market. It is, 
however, above all women, and especially those who are less educated, who are affected. For 
men, the incidence of a course which includes unemployment spells increases in the third 
cohort, but remains stable in the fourth, while a course across episodes of atypical work 
progressively increases, but without ever reaching the levels experienced by women. 
Moreover, although the polarization of life-courses by level of education has remained more 
or less constant for men, it has increased for women. As the Italian studies referred to above 
on ‘partial and selective deregulation’, and recent reports from the European Union [European 
Commission have shown, it is mostly women, and even more so women with lower education 
levels, who work part-time, or on atypical contracts, and risk high mobility levels and 
prolonged periods of uncertainty. 
If we combine the three dimensions studied so far (that is, the position in the labour 
market at age 35, the route followed to attain it, and the birth of at least one child), we obtain 
a snapshot of how the ‘life packages’ of men and women aged 35 have changed. Among men 
born in the 1940s, one in two was a ‘easy’ insider with children at 35, and one in four a ‘easy’ 
insider without children. This had little to do with education levels, although it was more 
common for less-educated men to have become insiders in a ‘difficult’ way, after undergoing 
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at least one period of unemployment or working in the irregular labour market. For men born 
in the 1960s, by contrast, one in four was a ‘easy’ insider with children at age 35. Once again, 
differences in education levels do not seem significant, although, as we have seen, better-
educated men delayed the transition to the first child for longer, and waited for the ‘right, 
stable’ job more often, and therefore did not go through periods of non-work or work on 
fixed-term contracts. Better-educated men, therefore, were ‘easy insiders without children, 
and ‘difficult’ insiders with children, more frequently than less-educated men.  
For women, the ‘life package’ between work and family attained by the age of 35 
depended closely on education even in the past. In the cohort of women born in the 1940s, 
one out of three women with an upper-secondary diploma or a degree was a easy insider with 
children, compared with only one out of five lower-educated women. In the cohort of those 
born in the 1960s, these shares diminish to one out of four women with upper-secondary 
diplomas or degrees and one out of six lower-educated women. Among lower-educated 
women, in the past as today, there was a large incidence of difficult insider packages with 
children, and of women with atypical contracts with children. On the other hand, it has always 
been more unusual for women with upper-secondary diplomas or degrees to pass through 
stages of temporary contracts and irregular work or through periods of unemployment. What 
has changed – as it has for men – is the timing of having children. Hence, whereas in the older 
cohorts, the second most widespread life-package  (one out of five) was of difficult insiders 
with children, in the last cohort it was easy insiders without children. 
The trends which emerge in Figure 4 and Table 2 are in line with the results obtained by 
other studies. Labour-market reforms over the past twenty years, together with a sluggish, and 
in some areas stagnant, economy weighed down by a very large public debt, have made 
employment conditions and income prospects more unstable. The initial career paths of young 
people have become more fragmentary, with more episodes of short-term employment and/or 
involuntary part-time work, and more interruptions due to periods of unemployment 
[Anastasia et al. 2011; Giorgi et al. 2011]. Women and the lower-educated are more 
frequently ‘trapped’ in atypical work [Bertolini and Rizza 2005; Dell’Aringa 2009]. To what 
extent this is a sign of weakness, or it constitutes being trapped in insecurity and poverty or a 
passage towards vicious circuits, is an open question. Certainly, atypical work, its duration 
and quality, and the importance attached to it is not unambiguous, and education appears once 
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again to draw significant demarcation lines. Bison et al. [2010] show that, since the Treu Law 
of 1997, the share of transitions to stable contracts has remained almost constant (at around 
25%), while the percentage of transitions to inactivity or unemployment has diminished, and a 
smaller amount of time elapses before finding the first job. Barbieri and Scherer [2005], on 
the other hand, show that starting a career with an atypical or irregular job reduces the 
chances of moving into stable employment, and increases the likelihood of not being 
employed at 35. For university graduates, therefore, remaining unemployed for longer periods 
immediately after graduation, and waiting for the ‘right’ first job, seem to be more 
satisfactory than accepting earlier an atypical job, or a job in the irregular labour market, or 
one for which they are over-qualified. Piccone Stella [2007], however, demonstrates that the 
‘flexibility-insecurity’, ‘flexibility-motivation’, and ‘flexibility-investment’ nexuses are not 
constant, and education is a crucial determinant. Flexibility is often represented as a forced 
condition to which one nevertheless adapts, through a socialization process which modifies 
states of mind and aspirations. [Micheli 2006]. To use an expression coined by Accornero 
[2006], in many cases, and especially in those where education levels and qualifications are 
high, “flexibility is sought more than it is undergone”, because of the pleasure of rejecting the 
constraints of a job which is always the same or of changing life-domains, or because of the 
chance to develop what may become a valuable individual career path independently and 
creatively. In any event, as a number of studies have shown, contractual instability leads to 
increased uncertainty, however much it may be experienced and practised. Even in the case of 
‘valuable’ jobs, and even where effective safety nets exist (the resources of the individual 
him/herself, partner or family), this uncertainty tends to hinder long-term life projects. The 
world of atypical labour, in fact, is replete with couples whose family transitions are running 
late, even though there may be a declared intent to catch up [Micheli 2006].  
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Table 2. Life-course packages between first job and the age of 35, by cohort, sex and education 
 
 Cohort Men Women 
  High education Low education High education Low education 
Easy insider  
 with children  
     
 1930-39 47.1 43.2 38.4 23.1 
 1940-49 57.3 47.7 32.3 24.6 
 1950-59 44.0 39.1 32.7 24.3 
 1960-69 25.2 26.0 20.5 15.3 
Easy insider  
 without children 
     
 1930-39 20.0 11.6 20.6 8.2 
 1940-49 15.3 10.7 13.6 6.9 
 1950-59 22.1 9.6 13.3 5.1 
 1960-69 29.6 19.5 18.6 9.7 
Difficult insider  
 with children 
     
 1930-39 20.0 22.7 6.9 10.6 
 1940-49 13.9 26.3 18.2 14.3 
 1950-59 15.9 28.4 21.0 17.5 
 1960-69 13.1 20.2 13.8 13.7 
Difficult insider  
 without children 
     
 1930-39 5.0 5.3 4.1 2.7 
 1940-49 4.6 4.0 5.9 1.9 
 1950-59 9.2 7.1 5.6 2.7 
 1960-69 12.7 10.8 7.9 6.2 
Atypical  
 with children 
     
 1930-39 5.0 12.8 11.0 12.2 
 1940-49 5.7 6.9 8.6 11.0 
 1950-59 4.8 9.8 8.2 8.9 
 1960-69 5.7 11.0 9.2 12.2 
Atypical  
 without children 
     
 1930-39 1.4 2.4 2.7 3.5 
 1940-49 2.9 2.6 2.7 2.2 
 1950-59 2.8 2.1 4.0 1.9 
 1960-69 9.3 5.1 10.5 3.7 
Outsider (not working)      
 1930-39 1.4 2.0 16.4 39.6 
 1940-49 0.4 1.8 18.6 39.1 
 1950-59 1.2 4.1 15.2 39.6 
 1960-69 4.6 7.4 19.5 39.3 
Notes:  Insider: those, aged 35, working as self-employed or employee with permanent contract; Atypical: those, aged 35, working employee 
with fixed-term contract or without contract; Easy insider: those never experiencing, between first job and the age of 35, atypical job or 
unemployment; Difficult insider: : those ever experienced, between first job and the age of 35, at least one spell of  atypical job or 
unemployment. 
:    low education=up to lower secondary education;  high education = upper secondary or tertiary education 
Source:   our elaboration on ILFI data(2005). 
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Source:   our elaboration on ILFI data(2005). 
 
Figure 5: Unemployment and atypical job spells between first job and the age of 35,  by sex, education and 
cohorts 
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5.   Starting a family: the impact of education and employment conditions by gender  
 
What, therefore, is the link between work and family trajectories? In this section, we use 
discrete event history models4 to analyse the extent to which education and the type of work 
indicate the path to the first child, to what extent this was the case in the past compared with 
today, and to what extent the experience of men and women differ. The results are set out in 
Tables 3 and 4, first for men and women from all the cohorts, with and without the effect of 
couplehood (in Models 1 and 2), and then cohort by cohort, again with and without the effect 
of couplehood (in Models 3 to 10). 
    In the models which analyse the entire sample of men and women, the main result is the 
inverted U-shaped pattern of the parameters expressing the cohort effect (as in Lucchini and 
Schizzerotto, 2001). Whilst for men and women born in the 1940s and 1950s the probability 
of having a child by the age of 35 was higher than it had been for the previous generation 
(men and women born in the 1930s), it falls, clearly and significantly, for the 1960s cohort. 
This decrease is greater for men. 
   Important gender differences emerge in the weight of education and type of work on 
parenthood. For women, a high education level leads to a delay in forming a couple, and in 
the last cohort it also causes a delay in maternity. For men, education also has a negative 
effect, especially in the last two cohorts. This effect, however, is closely correlated with later 
entry into a union, given that it later proves non-significant when controlling for whether or 
not an individual is part of a couple. As found by other studies (i.e. Vignoli et al. 2011), and 
as we pointed out above, delayed parenthood among educated men is more closely linked 
with delays in becoming settled in the labour market. Once settled, these men marry and have 
children within a short space of time. This is also evidenced by Tables 3 and 4 by the 
parameters regarding the ‘employed’, ‘class’ and ‘contract’ variables. For men, the negative 
effect stems not only from not having a job or being still in full-time education, but also from 
                                                          
4
 Event history analysis models are longitudinal regression models based on data concerning the dates of the various episodes 
marking the life histories of the interviewees, and which enable study of the duration of an episode as a function of time and 
various explanatory factors. The dependent variable, also known as the ‘transition rate’, is the conditional probability that a 
certain event will occur in each period of time during the life stretch being studied. In our case, the event is the birth of the 
first child, our observational window is the life course between the ages of 14 and 35, the dependent variable is the 
conditional probability of having a first child in a particular month, given this had not happened up until the previous month. 
We also use discrete models: these are non-parametric models which make no assumptions about the functional form of the 
time effect, and which estimate the transition rate by using standard binary regression models (in this case, logistic models).  
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being unskilled blue-collar, having a fixed-term contract, or working in the irregular labour 
market. 
   However, job-related and economic insecurity do not have such a direct, clear effect on the 
risks of motherhood. For women, in fact, in all the generations considered, whether or not 
they are in employment appears to make no difference, except for a weak effect in the last 
cohort which is the reverse of that for men: women not in employment have children earlier. 
In any event, this weak effect disappears when controlling for couplehood, and therefore 
indirectly the characteristics of the partner. Similarly, the transition to a first child seems to be 
facilitated, and not hampered, in the case of women with a fixed-term job or in irregular 
employment. This may, in fact, be symptomatic of low labour-market involvement on the part 
of women who perceive paid work within a couple as ‘subordinate’ to that of the partner, and 
therefore as endogenous and functional to having children. For women, the sector counts 
more than the contract. The guarantees and protections relating to maternity are greater for 
women in subordinate employment than for self-employed women, and greater for public-
sector female workers than for private-sector ones; and those with care responsibilities enjoy 
more favourable working hours, while their wages are not penalized. All of these elements 
work in favour of the decision to have a child. 
These results generally confirm the existence of ‘male breadwinner’ gender models which 
condition childbearing choices. When the decision is taken to have a first child, it must be 
‘he’, and not ‘she’ who enjoys a strong position in the labour market. Only ‘her’ investment in 
human capital seems to attenuate this model. The results also confirm that greater schooling 
and a later entry into the labour market are not the main reasons for the delays in childbirth 
exhibited by men and women born in the 1960s. These delays also emerge when controlling 
for duration of studies (whether or not the individual is still a student) and for education level. 
It is instead the position in the labour market, with the gender asymmetries already noted, 
which are influential. 
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Table. 3. Effects on transition to first child between 14 and 35 years old, by cohort (discrete event-history analysis model) – 
Men 
 All cohorts 
 
1930-39 1940-49 1950-59 1960-69 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  
Duration 
from age 14 
0,01 *** 0,00 * 0,02 *** 0,00  0,01 *** 0,00  0,01 *** 0,00 ** 0,01 *** 0,00  
Cohort 
(1930-39) 
                    
1940-49 0,19 ** -0,11                  
1950-59 0,08  -0,28 ***                 
1960-69 -0,45 *** -0,60 ***                 
Education 
level ( law) 
                    
Secondary 
school or 
degree 
-0,23 *** -0,06  -0,26 * 0,11  -0,08  -0,01  -0,23 ** -0,08  -0,33 *** -0,03  
Geographical 
area ( North) 
                    
Centre 0,15 ** 0,22 ** 0,10  0,35 * 0,17  0,23 * 0,28 ** 0,24 * -0,02  0,03  
South – Isles 0,40 *** 0,55 *** 0,05  0,23  0,36 ** 0,66 *** 0,52 *** 0,71 *** 0,58 *** 0,57 *** 
In education 
(No) 
                    
Yes -0,57 *** -0,49 *** -0,14  -0,12  -0,40 ** -0,35  -0,82 *** -0,90 *** -0,99 *** -0,91 *** 
Employed 
(Yes) 
                    
No -1,25 *** -0,55 *** -1,05 *** -0,28  -1,32 *** -0,67 ** -1,20 *** -0,58 * -1,43 *** -0,59 ** 
Classa  
(Service) 
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Routine non-
manual 
employee 
0,01  -0,01  -0,11  0,28  0,38 * 0,03  -0,10  -0,15  -0,27  -0,10  
Skilled 
worker 
-0,03  0,02  -0,04  0,07  0,00  -0,16  0,03  0,37 * -0,15  -0,11  
Unskilled 
worker 
-0,15 * 0,01  -0,12  0,19  -0,11  -0,10  -0,18  0,05  -0,19  0,06  
Self 
employed 
(No) 
                    
Yes -0,12  0,03  -0,31  0,40  -0,02  0,10  0,11  -0,13  -0,32  -0,05  
Contracta 
(permanent) 
                    
Fixed-term or 
without 
contract 
-0,13 * -0,03  -0,08  0,01  -0,29  -0,31  -0,21  0,04  0,06  0,23  
Sectora  
(pubblic) 
                    
Private -0,02  -0,02  -0,08  0,27  -0,06  0,07  0,08  -0,28 * -0,13  -0,15  
In couple 
(No) 
              3,64 ***     
Yes   3,88 ***   4,36 ***   3,95 ***       3,65 *** 
                     
Costant -6,90 *** -6,82 *** -7,22 *** -7,68 *** -6,93 *** -7,06 *** -6,50 *** -6,59 *** -7,14 *** -7,16 *** 
                     
Log-
likelihood 
-
13931,4 
 -
11344,2 
 -
2945,8 
 -
2268,1 
 -
3760,8 
 -
3040,5 
 -
3942,9 
 -
3281,4 
 -
3231,4 
 -
2696,9 
 
N. person-
months 
628711  612272  120000  117896  145311  141927  161600  157602  201800  194847  
N. people 3412  3337  660  650  826  806  908  890  1018  991  
Source:   our elaboration on ILFI data(2005). 
 Note:     a   Only for employees                  b   Including unskilled workers in industrial and tertiary sector  
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Table. 4. Effects on transition to first child between 14 and 35 years old, by cohort (discrete event-history analysis model) –
Women 
 All cohorts 
 
1930-39 1940-49 1950-59 1960-69 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  
Duration 
from age 14 0,01 *** 0,00 *** 0,01 *** 0,00 *** 0.01 *** -0,01 *** 0.01 *** -0,01 *** 0.01 *** 0,00 ** 
Cohort 
(1930-39)                     
1940-49 0,28 *** 0,06                  
1950-59 0,33 *** -0,01                  
1960-69 -0,09  -0,29 **                 
Education 
level ( law)                     
Secondary 
school or 
degree -0,34 *** -0,02  -0,30 * 0,00  -0.41 *** -0,04  -0.20 * 0,19  -0.35 *** -0,21 * 
Geographical 
area ( North) 
                    
Centre 0,02  0,13 * -0,16  0,13  0.07  0,00  0.03  0,14  0.13  0,30 * 
South – Isles 0,05  0,33 *** -0,11  -0,12  -0.17 * 0,20  0.05  0,55 *** 0.39 *** 0,58 *** 
In education 
( No)                     
Yes -1,29 *** -0,69 *** -0,70 ** -0,05  -1.23 *** -0,53 ** -1.40 *** -0,90 *** -1.60 *** -1,05 *** 
Employed 
(Yes)                     
No -0,03  -0,04  0,09  -0,05  0.24  -0,10  -0.10  0,12  -0.33 * -0,23  
Classa  
(Service)                     
Routine non-
manual 
employee -0,09  -0,25 * 0,00  -0,72  0.10  0,07  -0.10  -0,24  -0.21  -0,38 * 
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Skilled 
worker -0,29 * -0,30  0,15  -0,23  -0.31  -0,26  -0.26  -0,42  -0.32  -0,19  
Unskilled 
worker -0,14  0,00  -0,22  -0,36  0.07  0,21  -0.15  0,14  -0.19  -0,18  
Self 
employed 
(No)                     
Yes -0,25 * -0,24 * -0,29  -0,28  -0.20  -0,13  -0.51 * -0,49 * -0.11  -0,19  
Contracta 
(permanent) 
                    
Fixed-term or 
without 
contract -0,06  0,25 ** 0,06  0,48 * -0.02  0,25  -0.13  0,28 * -0.12  0,10  
Sectora  
(pubblic)                     
Private -0,10  -0,10  -0,20  0,08  -0.26 * -0,44 ** -0.02  0,00  -0.08  0,01  
In couple 
(No)                     
Yes   3,78 ***   4,08 ***   4,25 ***   3,61 ***   3,33 *** 
                     
Costant -5,82 *** -6,38 *** -6,05 *** -6,57 *** -5.84 *** -6,54 *** -5.21 *** -6,28 *** -5.72 *** -6,45 *** 
                     
Log-
likelihood 
-
16517,4  
-
13317,8  
-
3405,5  
-
2644,8  
-
4425.65  
-
3448,5  
-
4397.87  
-
3631,0  
-
4239.46  
-
3521,1  
N. person-
months 535722  516527  106682  102241  126345  123220  127866  123652  174829  167414  
N. people 3595  3515  708  685  907  891  933  916  1047  1023  
Source:   our elaboration on ILFI data(2005). 
 Note:     a   Only for employees                  b   Including unskilled workers in industrial and tertiary sector  
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6. Conclusions  
 
It is common discourse that young people in Italy today are worse off than they used to be, 
because what their parents achieved while still in their twenties is now achieved far later, if 
ever. It is also said, however, that choices have become more independent, more diversified, 
and less constrained within strict normative models. It is further claimed that waiting periods 
and postponements, as well as desynchronization and destandardization, are the result not only 
of structural transformations – that is, of a labour market which is increasingly difficult and 
uncertain, and a weak welfare system – but also of cultural changes, greater investment in 
education, and a process of individualization which places greater emphasis on personal 
autonomy and self-fulfilment, for women as well as men, which in its turn induces reversible 
choices and medium-term projects. In Italy, waiting periods and postponements, above all in 
regard to leaving the parental home, are also consequences of the country’s strong family 
model, with its intense and prolonged inter-generational solidarity which supports choices but 
also constrains them back. Because the data available are only behavioural, and especially in 
the absence of data on desires, satisfaction, income or other measures of well-being, it has not 
been possible to determine which of these narratives is more convincing. However, by 
comparing the histories of young people in four successive cohorts between the ages of 14 and 
35, and by separating them by gender and education level, we have at least been able to 
moderate the image of homogeneity or convergence which these interpretations frequently 
imply, and to show for whom, and to what extent, the path to adulthood has changed the most: 
whether for men or women, or for the better- or less-educated; whether in the labour market or 
in starting a family. Our findings therefore prompt further reflection on possible inequalities 
among cohorts, as well as within them. Our analyses have confirmed that today’s young 
Italians form a ‘postponement generation’, which achieves later, if at all, what previous 
generations had already achieved in their twenties. In fact, the profile of the life-courses of 
today’s 35-year-olds is far different from that of their parents and grandparents at age 35. The 
lack of continuity between the cohorts becomes evident with the last cohort studied, that of 
individuals born in the 1960s, who entered the labour market and built their careers and 
families in the 1990s, when the process of labour-market deregulation began in the context of 
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slow economic growth and scant reform of labour policies, the social shock absorbers, and 
policies in support of reconciliation and care. Although worker and welfare protection in the 
so-called ‘golden years’ may have exhibited a significant segmentation involving only 
dependent employees, above all those working in large firms and in the public sector, until the 
cohort of men born in the 1960s it was the norm for both higher- and lower-educated men to 
be insiders at age 35, and to achieve that status rapidly. What has changed is that workers 
become labour-market insiders later, and the route is more tortuous, with long and repeated 
spells of unemployment or atypical work. For women – for whom being in employment, and 
working as insiders, has never been the norm – the change has been their greater involvement 
in the labour market, but with the greater risk, compared with men, of job insecurity, 
especially if their education level is low. As a number of studies have argued, this greater level 
of insecurity is not unconnected with dominant gender assumptions regarding the allocation of 
family responsibilities both within the family itself and in the labour market and social 
policies.  
   In the later cohorts, the ages at first marriage or cohabitation and childbirth have also 
changed, especially for highly-educated men. These men, moreover, less and less frequently 
hold positions as insiders, and increasingly follow career paths characterized by episodes of 
atypical work. These episodes may be of a higher quality than in the case of lower-educated 
men, but they still induce delays in assuming family responsibilities. For women, on the other 
hand, economic and job insecurity seem to have less influence on childbirth, which reflects the 
continuing influence of a traditional model of roles division whereby it is the man who should 
be the breadwinner, and who must attain a good position in the labour market, before starting a 
family. 
The polarization of behaviour according to education level has also increased among the 
cohorts, to the extent that in the case of the final one, the gaps between low and high education 
levels, and the delays for better-educated men, are maximum. For women, differences by 
education as a factor in labour-market participation have always been marked, but in the 
younger cohorts the gap in participation is growing, and family timings are diverging. For 
women, it is educational qualification and the choice of sector (private or public), rather than 
the type of contract and social class, which differentiate maternity times, which highlights the 
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importance of identity models – that is, the desire to engage in non-domestic spheres – as well 
as of the employment conditions which render these desires compatible with maternity.  
   Over time, and with marked differences by gender, the sequence of the path to adulthood 
changes as well. For men, the typical sequence was, and still is (although it is today delayed), 
‘first job – first stable job – marriage – children’. By contrast, the majority of educated women 
marry, and then have their first child, before becoming insiders, because it still seems that the 
normative pre-condition for starting a family is that it should the man who is an insider. The 
sequence does not change in the case of lower-educated women: for these being an insider has 
never been important, so that more than one-half of women never achieve this status, partly 
because many have never worked. 
   Joint examination of employment conditions and family and childbirth goals before age 35 
shows an evident change between the young people of today and their parents and 
grandparents. There has been a progressive decrease in the share of men and women achieving 
insider status in the labour market via a simple route, and who have a child before they reach 
35. 
   In general, our findings show that substantial changes taken place in the times and paths 
towards adulthood in today’s younger generation compared with those of the parents and 
grandparents. These changes are indubitably the outcome of new preferences and new 
opportunities. Delays in entering the labour market and in assuming familial and parental roles 
have enabled the younger generation, particularly women, to make greater investment in 
human capital, and to venture into more diversified areas of life. For more highly-educated 
individuals, delay is also a strategy to secure a ‘good’ transition to adulthood, and to begin 
virtuous careers which ensure a certain lifestyle and the fulfilment of aspirations and 
investments. In Italy, the delay is more prolonged, even among more highly-educated young 
men and women; and the contrasts with less-educated men and women are more marked than 
elsewhere. Structural and institutional constraints also have an impact. The growing instability 
of employment conditions and earnings in the early stages of a career – which result from 
changes in the demand for labour and in its regulation over the past twenty years which have 
not been off-set by support in terms of universalistic welfare, nor in regard to unemployment, 
living apart from the family of origin, and caregiving responsibilities – has certainly done 
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nothing to facilitate independence from the family of origin or the realization of family-based 
projects. 
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